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OIL & GAS LAW
INTRODUCTION
Two oil and gas issues generate continuous debate: the calculation of
royalties paid on oil and gas produced on federal land,' and the scope of fed-
eral preemption of state oil and gas regulations.2 The Tenth Circuit addressed
both issues during the survey period.3 Santa Fe Energy Products Co. v.
McCutcheon4 considered calculation of federal royalties when oil or gas is
sold by a producer in a non-arm's length transaction. Panhandle Eastern
Pipeline Co. v. Oklahoma6 discussed the relative authority of federal and state
regulations governing oil and gas activities.7
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
Domestic natural gas production continues to rise and reached 19 trillion
cubic feet in 1996.' Crude oil production, although at a forty-two year low,
forged ahead at 6.4 million barrels a day in 1996.9 Revenues to the federal
treasury generated by rent and royalties from oil and gas activities on federal
land are measured in the billions of dollars annually; only federal income tax
revenue exceeds the revenue generated by the nation's natural resources.'"
Federal regulation of this vast enterprise has expanded over the past sixty
years. State and local governments regulated natural gas sales prior to 1938."
However, Supreme Court decisions in 1918 and 1924 restricted the state regu-
1. See, e.g., Owen L. Anderson, Calculating Royalty: "Costs" Subsequent to Produc-
tion-"Figures Don't Lie, But .. ", 33 WASHBURN LJ. 591, 591 (1994). "Royalty payment
disputes, particularly those involving gas, will continue to be a chief source of litigation in the fu-
ture." Id.
2. See, e.g., David E. Pierce, Reconciling State Oil and Gas Conservation Regulation with
the Natural Gas Act: New Statutory Revelations, 1989 BYU L. REV. 9, 10 (1989). "After fifty
years of experience under the Natural Gas Act (NGA), allocation of federal and state authority to
regulate oil and gas production remains unclear." Id.
3. In addition, the Tenth Circuit decided two other oil and gas cases between September,
1995 and August 1996. First, the court considered a private contract dispute with respect to drill-
ing company leases in Slawson Exploration Co. v. Vintage Petroleum, Inc., 78 F.3d 1479 (10th
Cir. 1996). Second, the court examined the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission in the context of interstate transportation of gas in Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FERC,
83 F.3d 1298 (10th Cir. 1996).
4. 90 F.3d 409 (10th Cir. 1996).
5. Santa Fe Energy Prods., 90 F.3d at 411-15.
6. 83 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 1996).
7. Panhandle, 83 F.3d at 1225-29.
8. American Gas Association, Preliminary Findings Concerning 1996 Natural Gas Re-
serves (visited June 11, 1997) <http://www.aga.com/gio/96gas.htrnl>.
9. Telephone Interview with Joe Lastelic, Spokesman, American Petroleum Institute (June
11, 1997).
10. Michael E. Shapiro, Sagebrush and Seaweed Robbery: State Revenue Losses from
Onshore and Offshore Federal Lands, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 481, 481 (1985).
11. WILIAM A. MOGEL, TRANSPORTATION AND MARKETING OF NATURAL GAs 19 (1985).
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lation of oil and gas within interstate commerce." Congress reacted to the
interstate regulatory gap by enacting the Natural Gas Act (NGA) in 1938."
The stated purpose of the NGA is to protect the public interest by regulating
the transportation and sale of natural gas in interstate commerce.' 4 Congress
vested NGA oversight in the Federal Power Commission (FPC) (subsequently
renamed the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)). Oil shortag-
es and rising oil prices led Congress to amend the NGA regulatory scheme by
enacting the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA).'6 The NGPA altered
the method for computing natural gas pricing by abandoning a cost-based
formula requiring complex calculations of producer costs.' The act instituted
a new method that categorized gas based on the circumstances of its produc-
tion and sale.' The categories are defined by various circumstances of the
'T"ist sale" of the gas.19
Problems computing oil and gas royalties" led Congress to enact the
Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act of 1982 (FOGRMA). 2 Con-
gress hoped to mitigate a number of ills affecting federal oil and gas manage-
ment, including royalty procedures overwhelmed by the growing volume and
complexity of accounting systems, drilling field thefts of equipment and oil,
12. Id. at 19-20 (citing Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1924) and Public
Util. Comm'n v. Landon, 249 U.S. 236 (1918)).
13. MoGEL, supra note 11; Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717, 717a-717w (1994).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 717(a)-(b) (1994).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 7172(a)(1)(C) (1994).
16. MOGEL, supra note 11, at 59. See also Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
17. MOGHEL,supra note 11, at 63.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 64 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 3301(21) (1994)). The statute defines "first sale":
(A) General rule.-The term "first sale" means any sale of any volume of natural gas-
(i) to any interstate pipeline or intrastate pipeline;
(ii) to any local distribution company;
(iii) to any person for use by such person;
(iv) which precedes any sale described in clauses (i), (ii), or (iii); and
(v) which precedes or follows any sale described in clauses (i), (ii), (iii), or
(iv) and is defined by [FERC] as a first sale in order to prevent circumvention
of any maximum lawful price not established under this chapter.
(B) Certain sales not included.-Clauses (i), (i), (iii), or (iv) of subparagraph (A) shall
not include the sale of any volume of natural gas by any interstate pipeline, intrastate
pipeline, or local distribution company, or any affiliate thereof, unless such sale is attrib-
utable to volumes of natural gas produced by such interstate pipeline, intrastate pipeline,
or local distribution company, or any affiliate thereof.
15 U.S.C. § 3301(21).
20. Criticisms of federal oil and gas royalty management led Secretary of the Interior James
Watt to appoint a panel to study the Department of Interior's royalty accounting systems. The
panel issued its report in January of 1982. U.S. COMM'N ON FIscAL ACcOuNTABILIry, U.S. DEP'T
OF INTERIOR, FISCAL ACCOUNTABILrrY OF THE NATION'S ENERGY RESOURCES: REPORT OF THE
CoMISSiON 13-39 (1982). The Commission was popularly named for its chair, David E.
Linowes, and this publication is thus known as the "Linowes Report." The report contained sixty
recommendations for royalty reform, after listing many problems with the current regulatory
framework. Its recommendations drove Congress to swift action; the President signed FOGRMA
on January 12, 1983. Laura Lindley, Of Teapot Dome, Wind River and Fort Chaffee: Federal Oil
and Gas Resources, NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T, Summer 1995, at 25.
21. Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act of 1982, 30 U.S.C. §§ 188, 191, 1701-57
(1994).
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and federal government reluctance to take advantage of state and Indian tribe
offers to assist in royalty management.' Furthermore, Congress determined
that companies underpaid royalty obligations by as much as 10 percent, result-
ing in an estimated loss of $500 million annually." These problems led Con-
gress to the reforms embodied in FOGRMA. 4 The Tenth Circuit considered
regulations promulgated under FOGRMA targeting royalty management in
Santa Fe Energy Products Co. v. McCutcheon.'
II. AFFniATE SALES AND ROYALTY CALCULATIONS
A. Background
To address serious defects in royalty management and the methodologies
used to compute the lessor's royalties under federal oil and gas leases, Con-
gress enacted FOGRMA in 1982.' Among the reforms instituted by
FOGRMA is a framework for federal royalty management and enforcement.
This scheme directs the Mineral Management Service (MMS) to solicit the
assistance of states and Indian tribes to enforce its provisions.27 The statute
defines the rights and responsibilities of lessees, operators, and other persons
involved in oil and gas transportation and the sale of oil and gas produced
from federal leases.' It also specifies record-keeping duties for operators,
audit authority for federal, state and Indian agencies, royalty payment method-
ologies, inspection rights, and civil and criminal penalties.'
Heightened audit requirements are among FOGRMA's reforms. Section
103(a) of FOGRMA requires federal oil and gas producers, transporters, les-
sees, and others to maintain royalty records." The act requires these parties
to produce royalty records upon request by the Secretary of the Interior, a
state, or any Indian tribe.3 The Secretary delegated authority to the MMS to
audit royalty payments." As a result of these reforms, Congress hoped to
remedy serious defects in the royalty management system by conducting more
22. H.R. REP. No. 97-859, at 15 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4268-69.
23. Id. at 16 (citing General Accounting Office reports).
24. Id. at 15-16.
25. 90 F.3d 409, 413 (10th Cir. 1996).
26. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
27. 30 U.S.C. § 1701(b)(5) (1994).
28. 30 U.S.C. § 1701(b)(l) (1994).
29. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1713-1715, 1718-1720 (1994).
30. Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act § 103(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1713 (1994). The
statute states:
A lessee, operator, or other person directly involved in developing, producing, transport-
ing, purchasing, or selling oil or gas subject to this chapter through the point of first sale
or the point of royalty computation, whichever is later, shall establish and maintain any
records ... and provide any information that the Secretary may, by rule, reasonably
require .... Upon the request of any officer or employee duly designated by the Secre-
tary or any State or Indian tribe conducting an audit or investigation pursuant to this
chapter, the appropriate records, reports or information... shall be made available for
inspection and duplication by such officer or employee ....
Id.
31. Id
32. 30 C.F.R. § 201.100 (1996).
1997]
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audits, thus collecting more royalty underpayments.3
Regulations promulgated under FOGRMA have been revised frequent-
ly.3' In 1988, the MMS established new oil valuation standards and proce-
dures,35 and revised the regulations that govern the value of oil and gas for
royalty purposes.' Prior to 1988, they had used the "gross proceeds rule: 3
the value of oil and gas production for royalty purposes included the total
value of money and other consideration derived by a lessee when making an
oil or gas disposition." The rule included a caveat oil values could be deter-
mined by reference to "other relevant matters." 9
The 1988 revision of the gross proceeds rule provided greater detail to
make royalty calculations.' The agency confirmed its commitment to the rule
by stating that they would generally "assess royalty on the value to which the
lessee is legally entitled under its arm's length contract. The MMS main-
tain[ed] that gross proceeds to which a lessee is legally entitled under arm's
length contracts are determined by market forces and thus represent the best
measure of market value."' 1
While reaffirming the 1988 revision of the gross proceeds, the MMS add-
ed a process to value oil production not sold in an arm's length transaction.'
Non-arm's length transactions, according to the MMS, include such situations
as intracompany use of oil, or a transaction lacking a sales contract. '3
The 1988 regulations provide the method for assessing the value of oil
for royalty purposes within non-arm's length transactions." Specified criteria
in a prescribed order are applied.' 5 If the first criterion reasonably applies to
33. H.R. REP. No. 97-859, at 15 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4268.
34. Mary Gilliam Zuchegno, How New Rules Affect Existing Oil and Gas Leases, 19 CoLo.
LAw. 2073, 2073 (1990).
35. Revision of Oil Product Valuation Regulations and Related Topics, 53 Fed. Reg. 1184
(1988) (codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 202, 203, 206, 207, 210, 241, and 43 C.F.R. pts. 3100, 3160).
Through the revision, the MMS sought to clarify existing regulations promulgated under the NGA,
including "that royalty is to be paid on all consideration received by lessees, less applicable allow-
ances, for lease production." Id.
36. Id. at 1186.
37. 30 C.F.R. § 206.103 (1987), amended by 53 Fed. Reg. 1184 (1988). The regulation con-
tains the gross proceeds rule:
The value of production, for the purpose of computing royalty, shall be the estimated
reasonable value of the product as determined by the Associate Director due consider-
ation being given to the highest price paid for a part or for a majority of production of
like quality in the same field, to the price received by the lessee, to posted prices, and to
other relevant matters.
Id. (emphasis added).
38. Independent Petroleum Ass'n of Am. v. Babbitt, 92 F.3d 1248, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(citing 30 C.F.R. § 206.151 (1995)).
39. 30 C.F.R. § 206.103.
40. Revision of Oil Product Valuation Regulations and Related Topics, 53 Fed. Reg. at
1186.
41. Id.
42. Revision of Oil Product Valuation Regulations and Related Topics, 52 Fed. Reg. 1858,




45. 30 C.F.R. § 206.102(c) (1988).
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the circumstance of the sale, it is used; otherwise the next applicable criterion
is used.' The criteria are: (1) The lessee can use its own current posted
prices used in arm's length transactions for similar oil sold in significant
quantities in the same field; (2) if the lessee has no posted prices, then an
arithmetic average of the posted prices, given the same circumstances of the
first method, is used; (3) if no posted price exists in the same field, then
prices used in a similar field; (4) if no contemporaneous arm's length transac-
tions, then spot sales postings and other relevant information; and (5) a net-
back procedure that works backward from the sales price to determine the
value to the lessee.' In addition, the fifth criterion allows for any other rea-
sonable means to calculate value where all of the previous means are inappli-
cable. 4
Thus, the 1988 revision served to substantially clarify the "other relevant
matters"' 9 language of the pre-1988 regulation, especially in the area of non-
arm's length transactions. It was under these regulations that the Tenth Cir-
cuit decided the following case.
B. Santa Fe Energy Products Co. v. McCutcheon5°
1. Facts
Santa Fe Energy Resources Company (Producer) and one of its affiliates
were the targets of a California State Controller's Office's audit covering
royalty payments from 1984 through 1987." The California agency wanted
to determine if Producer had mistakenly valued oil for royalty purposes.52 In
the transaction at issue, Producer produced oil under federal leases in Cali-
fornia and sold most of its oil to its affiliate, Santa Fe Energy Products Com-
pany (Marketing Affiliate).53 Producer had calculated royalties based on the
value of the sale by Producer to its Marketing Affiliate. 4 Although Producer
was the lessee of record, the California agency requested documents from
Marketing Affiliate to determine if Producer chose the proper values when
computing the royalties paid on the oil sold to Marketing Affiliate.55
Following Marketing Affiliate's refusal to produce documents, the MMS
issued a compliance order to Producer.56 Marketing Affiliate appealed the
MMS' order to its director, who affirmed the agency's order.57 Thereafter,
46. Id.
47. 30 C.F.R. § 206.102(c)(1)-(6) (1988).
48. 30 C.F.R. § 206.102(c)(5) (1988).
49. 30 C.F.R. § 206.103 (1987).
50. 90 F.3d 409 (10th Cir. 1996).
51. Santa Fe Energy Prods., 90 F.3d at 411.
52. ld. at 411-12.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 412.
55. Id. at 411-12.
56. Id. at 412.
57. l. The Tenth Circuit quoted the MMS' director's finding that
[tihe issue in this case is whether the transfer [between Producer and Marketing Affili-
ate], admittedly not at arm's length, represents fair market value. The request for infor-
mation from [Marketing Affiliate] was meant to ascertain that fact .... Without the
1997]
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Marketing Affiliate appealed to the Interior Board of Land Appeals
(IBLA)5 The IBLA affirmed the director's order, stating that the MMS
could examine the records of an "affected person" '9 and was not limited to
examining the records of the federal lessee. 60 Marketing Affiliate's petition
for reconsideration was denied by the IBLA."'
Marketing Affiliate subsequently filed a complaint in federal district
court asking for a review of the IBLA decision.' The MMS countered by
filing a motion for summary judgment.' The district court granted the mo-
tion, stating that the MMS has the "broad discretion to require disclosure of
information."
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment in favor of the MMS.' The court rejected Marketing Affiliate's two
arguments.' First, Marketing Affiliate contended that the district court erred
by not applying the 1988 revisions to the regulations governing royalty man-
agement.67 In dismissing this argument, the court noted that the revised reg-
ulations were prospective and did not affect the oil produced during the audit
period.' An earlier IBLA decision, Exxon Co., U.SA.,' had established
that the MMS specifically intended the 1988 regulations to apply to gas pro-
duction on or after March 1, 1988. The court noted that agency interpreta-
tions of their own rules must be given great deference.7' Thus, the court de-
clined to apply the 1988 revisions to the regulations governing royalty
management.'
Second, Marketing Affiliate asserted that the MMS erred when choosing
information requested from [Marketing Affiliate], the State and MMS cannot make a
reasonable determination as to the value of the crude oil for royalty purposes, since the
lessee's gross proceeds always is the minimum value.
Id. (citing 30 C.F.R. § 206.103 (1987)).
58. Id.
59. Under section 103(a) of FOGRMA, a "person directly involved in ... purchasing or
selling oil or gas [is] subject to [the Act]." Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act of
1982 § 103(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1713 (1994). The Act defines "person" as "any individual, firm,
corporation, association, partnership, consortium, or joint venture." Federal Oil and Gas Royalty
Management Act § 3(12), 30 U.S.C. § 1702(12) (1994).




64. Id. at 413.
65. Id. at 415.
66. Id. at 413-15,
67. Id. at 413.-
68. Id. Marketing Affiliates' royalty audit covered the period from January 1, 1984, to June
30, 1987, and the revised royalty management regulations were expressly applied to oil produc-
tion on or after March 1, 1988. Id. at 413 (citing 53 Fed. Reg. 1184, 1230 (1988)).
69. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 128 LB.L.A. 22 (1993).
70. Id. at 24 (referring to the intent of the MMS, as represented in the Revision of Oil
Product Valuation Regulations and Related Topics, 53 Fed. Reg. at 1230 (1988)).
71. Santa Fe Energy Prods. v. McCutcheon, 90 F.3d 409, 413 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing
Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994)).
72. Id.
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the point at which royalties were computed, the proper point being the sale
between Producer, the federal lessee, and Marketing Affiliate, rather than the
sale between Marketing Affiliate and a third party, as the MMS asserted."
Consequently, Marketing Affiliate argued that the records of its sales to third
parties were not available to the MMS under FOGRMA's record-keeping and
audit requirements.
The court looked to the text of FOGRMA to determine the extent of the
statute's record-keeping requirements." Section 103(a) of FOGRMA re-
quires a lessee, "or other person," involved in producing, transporting, and
marketing oil or gas through the first sale, or royalty calculation point, to
maintain those records required for compliance with royalty regulations." A
"person" is defined as "any individual, firm, corporation, association, partner-
ship, consortium, or joint venture."76 Since Marketing Affiliate is a "person"
as defined by FOGRMA, and Marketing Affiliate was the first purchaser of
oil produced by Producer under a federal lease, the court concluded that sec-
tion 103(a) applied. Thus, Marketing Affiliate must allow access to its re-
cords."
Next, the court applied the pre-1988 gross proceeds rule, discussed
above.78 The "other relevant matters" language, which concededly provided
very little guidance to the MMS, allowed the agency to inquire about Market-
ing Affiliates' sales in order to determine fair market value." Their sale of
oil would be a "relevant matter" under the pre-1988 regulation, as it could
help the MMS ascertain the fair market value of the oil at the time of its
transfer between Producer and Marketing Affiliate.'
Finally, the court concluded that the MMS' determination that Marketing
Affiliate must produce documents relating to the arm's length sale of oil
received from Producer "was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law."'
The court affirmed the district court's order of summary judgment in favor of
the government.'
73. Id.
74. Id. at 413-14.
75. See supra note 30.
76. 30 U.S.C. § 1702(12) (1994).
77. Santa Fe Energy Prods., 90 F.3d at 414-15.
78. Id. at 414. The court cited the following regulation:
The value of production, for the purpose of computing royalty, shall be the estimated
reasonable value of the product as determined by the Associate Director due consider-
ation being given to the highest price paid for a part or for a majority of production of
like quality in the same field, to the price received by the lessee, to posted prices, and
to other relevant matters.
Id. (citing 30 C.F.R. § 206.103 (1987)) (emphasis added).
79. Santa Fe Energy Prods., 90 F.3d at 414-15.
80. Id. at 414.
81. Id. at 414-15.
82. Id. at 415.
19971
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C. Analysis
Santa Fe Energy Products turns on the scope of FOGRMA's royalty
calculation methodologies, and the requisite audit authority to determine oil
and gas values for royalty purposes. Section 103(a) of FOGRMA requires
records to be kept through the "point of first sale or the point of royalty com-
putation, whichever is later." 3 The Tenth Circuit determined that Marketing
Affiliate's sale to a third party was the point of first sale, thus records could
be examined by the MMS with regard to that sale, in order to determine the
value of royalties owed by Producer."
The point of contention between Producer, Marketing Affiliate, and the
MMS was the period at which the agency should make royalty calculations.
To reframe the issue: At what point, from the oil's first gush up the wellhead
to the first arm's length sale downstream, is the value of the oil fixed for
purposes of royalty computations? The court determined that the "first sale"
was the sale by Marketing Affiliate to a third party, not the intracorporate
transfer of oil from Producer to Marketing Affiliate.'
Assume that the MMS audit, completed in the wake of this Tenth Circuit
decision, resulted in Producer paying higher federal royalties since the royalty
was now based on the higher market prices obtained by Marketing Affiliate.
The higher royalty charged to the producer calls into question the fairness of
this outcome. Commentators have noted that traditionally the lessee-in this
case Producer-is viewed as holding a greater risk vis-a-vis the lessor be-
cause the lessor's royalty expectation has few upfront risks while the lessee
risks the working interest and capital investment needed to explore, develop
and produce the oil or gas.' While the lessor's risk is low, however, the
lessor still has an interest in obtaining a fair value for its oil and gas." The
lessor bears the risk that the lessee will not diligently develop the oil or gas
and obtain a fair price for it."
This risk from reliance on the lessee to obtain a fair price upon which
the royalty is based was heightened by the advent of the use of marketing
affiliates to conduct the lessee's marketing efforts." Following FERC's re-
structuring of producer/pipeline/consumer relationships in the mid-1980s, oil
and gas producers were allowed to market what they produced, but were
reluctant to do so because of the attendant responsibilities of measuring, bill-
ing, and controlling the flow of its oil and gas, responsibilities traditionally
held by pipeline purchasers.9° Thus, producers developed the concept of
marketing affiliate.9
83. 30 U.S.C. § 1713(a) (1994).
84. Santa Fe Energy Prods. v. McCutcheon, 90 F.3d 409, 414 (10th Cir. 1996).
85. Id.
86. Anderson, supra note 1, at 59f.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Arthur J. Wright & Carla J. Sharpe, Direct Gas Saks: Royalty Problems for the Pro-
ducer, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 235, 236 (1993).
90. Id. at 235-36.
91. Id. at 236.
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The marketing affiliate relationship, according to one commentator,
served to mitigate producers' increased responsibility by (1) the producer
holding a larger share of gross proceeds by not sharing a portion of the sale
proceeds with royalty owners, and (2) capturing the cost of marketing efforts
through the affiliate. 92 Santa Fe Energy Products militates against the first
of these reasons for using marketing affiliates by interpreting federal royalty
regulations in a way which captures the value of the sale by the marketing
affiliate to a third party. 93
Whether the outcome of Santa Fe Energy Products is fair thus seems
tied to whether, and to what extent, the marketing affiliate may be used to
fulfill the lessee's obligation to obtain a fair price for the oil and gas. To the
extent that the sale by the marketing affiliate is the fair price contemplated by
the lessor for the return on its royalty interest, and that fair price is not the
price upon which the royalty is based, the outcome of Santa Fe Energy Prod-
ucts is fair, viewed in this light the MMS' regulations are only attempting to
capture the fair value for the royalty holder.
However, to the extent that an oil or gas producer does seek to obtain a
fair price in the non-arm's length sale to its marketing affiliate, the capture of
the sale price to the marketing affiliate's customer unfairly burdens the pro-
ducer with excessive royalty obligations. The FOGRMA statute requiring
royalty computation at the first arm's length sale,94 interpreted as encom-
passing the sale from a marketing affiliate to a third party," clearly favors
the lessor/royalty interest, since it captures a portion of the sales price which
may exceed the fair price upon which the oil or gas was transferred between
affiliates.
Practitioners should note that a recently enacted statute may change the
royalty management scheme yet again. On August 13, 1996, President
Clinton signed legislation intended to improve royalty management.9" The
Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Simplification and Fairness Act of 19969
(FOGRSFA) revises procedures for collecting royalty payments, including the
statute of limitations for audit exposure, interest payments on returns of
overpayments, and the delegation of royalty collection activities to the
states. 98
The practical effect of the legislation is unknown---regulations have not
been promulgated 9 -- but the MMS believes it will simplify royalty manage-
92. Id.
93. Santa Fe Energy Prods., 90 F.3d at 414.
94. 30 U.S.C. § 1713(a) (1994).
95. Santa Fe Energy Prods., 90 F.3d at 414.
96. Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Simplification and Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
185, 110 StaL 1700 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.).
97. Id.
98. Id. §§ 3-5.
99. The MMS intends a phased approach to implementing the royalty management modifi-
cations mandated by FOGRSFA. Meeting on Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Simplification and
Fairness Act of 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 55,941 (1996). The MMS expects that FOGRSFA will re-
quire numerous changes to royalty management programs, including increased delegation of roy-
alty collection and enforcement activities to the states. Statement of Regulatory Priorities, 61 Fed
1997]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:2
ment1 ° Typical commentary to date describes the oil and gas industry's
"delight" at the prospect of royalty management reform.'" While the act is
designed to streamline royalty computations, collections, and audits," it
does not modify FOGRMA's description of the point at which royalty com-
putations are made in arm's length transactions."° As a consequence, the
outcome of Santa Fe Energy Products in a post-FOGRSFA setting would
vary to the extent of the types of records audited, the identity of the enforce-
ment agency, and the statute of limitations for audits. On the other hand, the
timing of royalty computations, such as the point of first sale in an arm's
length transaction, would not likely change.
III. PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW BY THE NATURAL GAS ACT
A. Background
As discussed above, the NGA and NGPA created a scheme of federal
regulation for the oil and gas industry.'" The preemption doctrine guides
analysis of the effect of these statutes." Under the Supremacy Clause,
Congress can enact federal statutes that preempt state law." The Supreme
Court recognizes three circumstances in which a federal statute preempts a
state statute." 7 First, Congress can provide for preemption expressly in the
statute."' Second, a state law is preempted if there is an actual conflict with
a federal law." Finally, a body of federal law may occupy a field, leaving
no room for state regulation."'
As early as 1947, and regularly since then, the Supreme Court has de-
scribed the NGA as a statute that occupies an entire area, within which the
states may not act."' Section l(b) of the NGA describes the scope of feder-
al authority as extending to the transportation and sale of natural gas, and to
Reg. 62,071, 62,073 (1996).
100. Industry Execs Applaud Clinton's Signing of Royalty Fairness Bill, INSIDE ENER-
GY/wrrH FED. LANDS, Aug. 19, 1996, at 14, available in 1996 WL 8697208 (quoting the MMS'
Director Cynthia Quarterman as saying that the new law would "provide additional certainty,
equity and simplicity in royalty management").
101. See, e.g., Kimberley Music, Clinton Signs Bill Writing New Book on Collection of Oil,
Gas Royalties, OIL DAILY, August 14, 1996, at 1.
102. S. REP. No. 104-260, at 13 (1996).
103. 30 U.S.C. § 1713(a) (1994). FOGRSFA does not modify FOGRMA's section
addressing the point of royalty computation.
104. See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
105. See infra note 147 and accompanying text for examples of the preemption doctrine as
applied to NGA and NGPA cases.
106. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, ci. 2.
107. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). For a discussion of pre-
emption and federal energy statutes, see Note, Preemption and Regulatory Efficiency in Federal
Energy Statutes, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1306 (1990).
108. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 331 U.S. 682, 690 (1947) ("As
was stated in the House Committee report, the 'basic purpose' of Congress in passing the Natural
Gas Act was 'to occupy this field in which the Supreme Court has held that the States may not
act.'") (citation omitted).
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companies engaging in such activity, but authority "shall not apply to... the
production or gathering of natural gas."" 2 The Supreme Court interpreted
"production or gathering" narrowly to ensure broad federal control over the
industry.113
Although the NGPA ostensibly served as a partial deregulation of the gas
market by removing certain price restrictions, the Supreme Court addressed
its true effect on the exclusive jurisdiction created by the NGA in Transconti-
nental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Mississippi Oil & Gas Board."4 The Court
held that the NGPA did not in fact alter the comprehensive regulatory scheme
created by the NGA, thus the "deep federal concern" over gas pricing con-
tinued to provide a rationale for federal preemption of state regulation."'5
B. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v. Oklahoma"6
1. Facts
Natural gas producers and purchasers (plaintiffs) challenged the constitu-
tionality of an Oklahoma statute affecting royalty payments." 7 The Oklaho-
ma legislature enacted Senate Bill 160 (SB 160) in 1984. " ' The law had
two principal effects. ' 9 First, the bill amended the procedure for determin-
ing the royalties paid to owners of drilling units."n Second, the bill forced
the first purchaser of the oil or gas to pay the required royalties.'2 ' In addi-
tion, the first purchaser could not contract out the responsibility to pay the
royalties.'"
The plaintiffs filed suit in district court against the Oklahoma Commis-
sioners of the Land Office.'" The owners of the mineral interests intervened
112. 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1994). Section l(b) of the Act states:
The provisions of this [Act] shall apply to the transportation of natural gas in interstate
commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate pub-
lic consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use, and to natural
gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale, but shall not apply to any other
transportation or sale of natural gas or to the facilities used for such distribution or to
the production or gathering of natural gas.
Id.
113. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 331 U.S. at 693.
114. 474 U.S. 409, 417-21 (1986).
115. Transcontinental, 474 U.S. at 421-22.
116. 83 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 1996).
117. Panhandle, 83 F.3d at 1221.
118. Id. at 1222. For purposes of convenience, the Tenth Circuit and this Survey refer to the
two revisions by the name of Oklahoma Senate Bill, SB 160.
119. Id. SB 160 amended two existing statutes: OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1(e) (Supp. 1984)
and OKiLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 540 (Supp. 1984).
120. Panhandle, 83 F.3d at 1223.
121. 1 Prior to SB 160, where two or more royalty owners had separate tracts within a
drilling unit, the lessee of the tract that included a producing well must have paid to the royalty
owners of the nonproducing tracts a one-eighth royalty in all production generated within the
unit. Id. at 1222 (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1(e) (Supp. 1984)). SB 160 altered royalty
owner's rights by adding to the one-eighth share an amount commensurate with the royalty
owner's interest in the unit. Id. at 1222-23 (citing 20 Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. 181 (1989)).
122. Panhandle, 83 F.3d at 1223.
123. Id. at 1224.
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as defendants in the case." The plaintiffs agreed that the repeal of SB 160
in 1992 remedied the constitutional issues, but the repeal arguably did not
apply to royalty payments during the period between 1985 and 1993.'7 The
amended complaint included a claim that federal law preempted SB 160."2
The district court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that
federal law preempted SB 160.'"
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision." s The court
considered two issues: the preemption of SB 160 by the NGA and
NGPA,' 9 and whether those portions of SB 160 that were constitutional
could be severed from the remainder of the statute.' 3
The court began by determining Congress' intent with respect to the
preemption of state law. 3' An inference of federal preemption occurs when
"Congress has legislated comprehensively to occupy an entire field of regula-
tion, leaving no room for the states to supplement federal law."'3 2 The rele-
vant federal law in this case was the NGA and NGPA 33 The court noted
that Congress enacted the NGA, in part, in response to a series of Supreme
Court decisions invalidating state regulation of interstate oil and gas activi-
ties." To fill this gap, the NGA created the Federal Power Commission
(now FERC) to regulate those activities from which the state was prohibit-
ed. 3 The NGPA did not alter this comprehensive regulatory scheme." 3
Next, the court turned to the question of the scope of FERC's authority,
in relation to that of the state, to regulate oil and gas. Pursuant to the NGA,
FERC regulates the transportation and sale of oil and gas in interstate com-
merce, as well as those companies engaged in such activity.37 The court
124. Id.
125. Id. The court stated
[Plaintiffs] have no dispute with SB 168 [which repealed SB 160], as it allows produc-
ers disadvantaged by its royalty payment provisions to offset any loss by producing a
correspondingly greater volume of gas than they would otherwise be entitled to pro-
duce. (Appellee-intervenors] agree that SB 168 remedied the constitutional defects of
SB 160, because SB 168 explicitly provides that a purchaser who pays its contracted
producer for gas taken is thereafter liable to no other parties. Thus, the determination
whether SB 160 was constitutional affects the rights and liabilities of these parties for
the period 1985 to 1993 only.
Id.
126. Id. at 1225.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1223.
129. Id. at 1225.
130. Id. at 1229.
131. Id. at 1225.
132. Id. (quoting Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kansas, 489
U.S. 493, 509 (1989)).
133. Id. at 1225-29.
134. Id.; see supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
135. Panhandle, 83 F.3d at 1225 (quoting Corporation Comm'n v. FPC, 415 U.S. 961, 962
(1974)).
136. Id. at 1226-27 (quoting Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Mississippi Oil & Gas
Board, 474 U.S. 409, 421 (1986)).
137. Id. at 1225-26 (quoting Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. FERC, 955 F.2d 1412, 1416
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found that the powers reserved to the states-those powers outside of FERC's
jurisdiction- include the regulation of the physical production and gathering
of oil and gas "in the interests of conservation or any other consideration of
legitimate local concern." 3 '
Thus, the issue of preemption turned on whether SB 160 fell within
physical production or gathering, the only allowable purview of state regula-
tion.'" The court concluded that SB 160 did not regulate physical produc-
tion or gathering.'" Instead, the court found that SB 160 directly regulated
interstate gas purchasers by making them liable to all royalty owners of a
particular drilling unit.14 By regulating interstate purchasers, and not just
producers, SB 160 imposed obligations on them that would "substantially and
materially influence their purchasing decisions."' 2 Because SB 160 over-
stepped the state's authority, the court found it preempted by the NGA and
NGPA to the extent of its effect on the purchase of natural gas from inter-
state pipelines.
Finally, the court had to decide whether the preempted portions of SB
160 could be severed from those provisions which were constitutional."
The court held that under Oklahoma law, the whole of SB 160 was preempt-
ed since the valid portions of the statute were "so essentially and inseparably
connected with and so dependent upon the void provisions" that the state
legislature would not have enacted the statute with only the valid provi-
sions."
C. Analysis
NGA and NGPA effectively reserve to the states a very specific and
limited area of regulation--states may regulate only the physical production
and gathering of oil and gas when they have legitimate local concerns.'"
Beyond this reservation, courts' holdings usually specify that the NGA and
NGPA preempt state law. In the past thirty years, the Supreme Court decided
six cases involving state law and its relation to the NGA, and found that state
law was preempted in all but one.'" Likewise, the Tenth Circuit has held
(10th Cir. 1992)).
138. Id. at 1225-26 (quoting Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 331 U.S. 682, 690 (1947)).
139. Id. at 1227-28.
140. Id. at 1228.
141. Id& at 1229.
142. Id. at 1228.
143. Id. at 1229.
144. Id. at 1229-31.
145. d. at 1229-30 (quoting OKLA. STAT. it. 75, § 1la (1995)). The issue of severability is
governed by state law. Id. at 1229.
146. Interstate Natural Gas, 331 U.S. at 690.
147. See Northwest Central Pipeline Corp., 489 U.S. at 518-19 (1989) (holding that the
NGA does not preempt a state regulation of production despite possible effect on interstate pur-
chasers; regulation was plausibly related to a legitimate state concern to protect correlative rights
of Kansas producers); Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 301-04 (1988) (holding
that the NGA preempted a state requirement that a public utility must obtain state approval to
transport natural gas and state statute impermissibly regulated rates of companies involved in the
interstate transportation of natual gas); Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Mississippi Oil
& Gas Board, 474 U.S. 409, 424-25 (1986) (holding that the NGA preempted the order of a state
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that states may not encroach upon federal regulation of the transportation,
sales, and distribution of oil and gas.'4
While case law appears well settled, commentators' assessment of the
effect of the NGA and its preemptive consequences fuels debate over the
statute's reach into intrastate activities. One commentator believes that the
jurisdictional distinction between federal and state governments created by the
NGA adequately protects consumers, in addition to being relatively simple for
the courts and agencies to apply."4 Others believe that the once useful, nar-
row construction by the Supreme Court of state powers over production and
gathering have increasingly become an impediment to the types of regulations
states need to effectively manage the growing complexity of oil and gas oper-
ations."s
Recent FERC orders have obscured the once clear distinction between
state control of production and gathering and federal control of pricing and
transportation. 5' FERC Orders 436152 and 636' deregulated many as-
pects of transportation and sales functions.'54 FERC issued Order 436 in
1985 to create "equal access" in the gas pipeline market; pipeline owners
must transport gas owned by third parties under the same terms as it trans-
ports its own gas. 5
FERC Order 636, issued in 1992, continued the process of deregulation
by requiring interstate pipelines to separately sell their transportation, storage,
and gas marketing services." It has been argued that the post-Order 636
oil and gas board requiring a pipeline company to purchase ratably from a gas pool because the
order undermined congressional intent to regulate prices); Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S.
176, 184 (1983) (holding that the NGA preempted state regulation prohibiting producers from
passing an increase in severance taxes through to consumers and that the regulation was preempt-
ed to the extent that the statute applied to sales of gas in interstate, as opposed to intrastate, com-
merce); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 748-51 (1981) (holding that the NGA preempted
state regulation providing for a state tax to be added to oil and gas owners' costs associated with
marketing the gas; this provision of the tax statute usurped FERC's authority to determine pipe-
line and producer costs); Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84, 95-96
(1963) (holding that the NGA preempted state regulation requiring pipeline to take ratably from
all connected users and that the regulation violated FERC's authority over sale and transportation
of natural gas in interstate commerce).
148. See Backus v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 558 F.2d 1373, 1375 (10th Cir. 1977);
Saturn Oil & Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 250 F.2d 61, 67 (10th Cir. 1957). After citing
Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 331 U.S. 682, 690-91, the court remarked
that "[tihis would seem to dispose of the point. The jurisdiction of the Commission is not defeat-
ed by state regulatory action." Saturn Oil & Gas, 250 F.2d at 67.
149. Frank R. Lindh, Federal Preemption of State Regulation in the Field of Electricity and
Natural Gas: A Supreme Court Chronicle, 10 ENERGY LJ. 277, 314 (1989).
150. Paula A. Sinozich et al., Project, The Role of Preemption in Administrative Law, 45
ADMN. L. REV. 107, 128, 145-46 (1993); Cody L. Graves & Maria Mercedes Seidler, The Reg-
ulation of Gathering in a Federal System, 15 ENERGY LJ. 405 (1994).
151. Graves & Seidler, supra note 150, at 408.
152. Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines after Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 50 Fed. Reg.
42,408 (1985) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 2, 157, 250, 284, 375, 381).
153. Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations Governing Self-Implement-
ing Transportation and Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 57
Fed. Reg. 13,267 (1992) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 284).
154. Graves & Seidler, supra note 150, at 405.
155. Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines after Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 50 Fed. Reg. at
42,408.
156. Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations Governing Self-Implement-
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environment effectively allows market forces to regulate gas gathering and
distribution functions, and as a result there is no compelling need for federal
preemption of these activities.'57
D. Other Circuits
The District of Columbia Circuit delivered a cautionary note during the
survey period, in United Distribution Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission.' There the court stated: "[Clonflict preemption analysis must be
applied with particular care in those instances in which the Commission seeks
to preempt state regulation merely because it has some effect on the interstate
transportation of natural gas."'59 While the court conceded that a state stat-
ute is not preempted merely because it might indirectly affect gas rates, a
statute will be preempted if it infringes upon one of the enumerated federal
responsibilities."
The state regulation at issue targeted "buy/sell" transactions involving
"agreements by which firm shippers allocate space on an interstate pipeline to
customers who negotiate their own wellhead transactions."'' The court
found that interstate transportation of the gas is a key element of the buy/sell
agreement.62 While the regulation indirectly affects rates, and thus may not
be preempted on that basis alone, the direct effect on interstate transportation
of gas does provide sufficient ground for preemption."
Thus, like the Tenth Circuit in Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co., the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit has affirmed the jurisdictional boundaries between
federal and state regulation of the oil and gas industry. The construction fol-
lowed by the District of Columbia and Tenth Circuits provides strict adher-
ence to the exclusive domains of state regulation of physical production and
gathering, and federal regulation of interstate transportation and sale of natu-
ral gas.
CONCLUSION
Tenth Circuit case law on oil and gas follows well-established rules of
law. Nearly sixty years have passed since the NGA's enactment; this aged
pedigree certainly contributes to the harmony of these decisions. Additionally,
the pervasive regulation of the industry, which has been conferred by the
ing Transportation and Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 57
Fed. Reg. at 13,267.
157. Graves & Seidler, supra note 150, at 422-23.
158. 88 F.3d 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
159. United Distrib. Co., 88 F.3d at 1157.
160. 1d at 1156-57 (citing Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293. 308 (1988)).
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NGA, amended by NGPA, and refined by FOGRMA, make this area a crea-
ture of regulatory law, where remarkably specific language establishing stan-
dards and procedures leaves little room for judicial discretion. The Tenth
Circuit has chosen to stay within the well-worn furrows of oil and gas prece-
dent.
Charles P. Henderson
